Duty to support and the dependant's claim: the struggle of women married in terms of customary and muslim law by Pienaar, J. M.
DUTY TO SUPPORT AND THE DEPENDANT’S
CLAIM: THE STRUGGLE OF WOMEN MARRIED
IN TERMS OF CUSTOMARY AND MUSLIM LAW
JM Pienaar
B Juris LLB LLM LLD
Professor, University of Stellenbosch
1 Introduction
Although the economic empowerment and independence of widows
are generally dependent on the enforcement of their inheritance rights
(and concomitant protection of property rights), a dependant’s successful
claim for loss of support in the case of a wrongful death of a husband also
contributes significantly to the widow’s ability to provide for herself and
her children.1
In South Africa, under the Roman-Dutch common law, the duty to
support has traditionally only been acknowledged in certain circum-
stances: if imbedded in a valid marriage or resulting from blood
relationship.2 Until 2000, valid marriages only included civil marriages
entered into in terms of the Marriage Act.3 Potentially polygynous
marriages were deemed to be against public policy and consequently not
recognised.4 The plight of widows from customary and Muslim marriages
was obvious: since the marriage was not recognised as valid, the duty to
support was not recognised either. These women, already vulnerable after
the death of a spouse, were — irrespective of the duration of the marriage
or the number of children born therefrom — without remedy. Widows
from civil marriages were, however, able to successfully claim main-
tenance in similar circumstances.
Strangely enough, despite the blanket non-recognition of customary
marriages until 2000,5 customary widows were accommodated by way of
legislative intervention as early as 1963 in relation to wrongful death
1 Although this contribution is written from the widow’s perspective, it is recognised that the death of a
wife may also result in the surviving spouse (widower) facing similar problems in practice, depending on
the specific circumstances.
2 This also includes adoption. See in this regard Neethling & Potgieter ‘‘Uitbreiding van die
Toepassingsgebied van die Aksie van die Afhanklike’’ 2001 THRHR 483 487-488.
3 125 of 1961.
4 See Maithufi & Moloi ‘‘The Current Legal Status of Customary Marriages in South Africa’’ 2002
TSAR 599-611 600-602 for a discussion of the reasons for non-recognition.
5 Even before the commencement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 on 15
November 2000, customary marriages were, however, also recognised for purposes of the following
legislation: s 21 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936; s 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of
1988; s 27 of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983; s 5(6) of the Maintenance Act 23 of 1963 and s 1 (the
definition of ‘‘married’’) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.
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claims. Section 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 76 of 1963
specifically provides for the institution of a claim for maintenance if all of
the requirements have been met. In practice, many of these requirements
are extremely problematic. Road Accident Fund v Mongalo,6 a 2003
decision, has confirmed that this Act, a remnant from a period when legal
measures were racially based, still provides the relevant mechanism to
effect claims for customary widows.
The plight of widows in Muslim marriages underwent a lengthy
piecemeal development in case law in which certain aspects of these
relationships were recognised over a period of time. In 1997 the
contractual basis of a de facto monogamous Muslim marriage was
recognised and enforced.7 The duty to support and consequential claim
for maintenance in the case of accidental death of a spouse was, however,
only recognised in 1999. In Amod v Multilateral Vehicle Accident Fund,8
the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that the widow’s right had to be
protected if there was a legal duty to support — irrespective of the
question whether the marriage was valid or not. By ‘‘properly applying’’
the common law principles, the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Amod
case (merely) extended the common law to include the claim for
maintenance for Muslim widows who were partners in a de facto
monogamous marriage.
Consequently the legal position regarding the claim of a dependant in a
customary and Muslim marriage can be summarised as follows:
customary wives, whose marriages have been recognised as valid
marriages since 15 November 2000, are still being sidelined by the
common law, including de facto monogamous marriages. These widows
have to make use of a racially based legislative measure with major
repercussions if not fully adhered to. Muslim widows, whose marriages
have as yet not been formally recognised (although development in this
regard is currently underway), have, however, been incorporated into the
common law — but only in relation to monogamous marriages. The
publication of the Muslim Marriages Bill specifically calls for the
recognition of monogamous and polygynous family structures.
It is the aim of this contribution to give an overview of the two
distinctive approaches concerning customary and Muslim widows
respectively in light of the new constitutional dispensation. The
dependant’s claim for support will first be placed in context by
emphasising the aims and requirements for this remedy after which a
brief historical background with regard to customary and Muslim
widows will follow. Thereafter the current mechanisms to realise these
claims will be set out and analysed. Questions whether the available
mechanisms function optimally, especially in view of the polygynous
6 2003 1 ALL SA 72 (SCA).
7 Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (CPD).
8 1999 4 SA 119 (SCA).
DUTY TO SUPPORT AND THE DEPENDANT’S CLAIM 315
nature of these marriages, will be posed particularly. Possible options
regarding the way forward will thereafter conclude the discussion.
2 The dependant’s claim for loss of support in context
2 1 Rationale and aims of action
It is not the aim of this contribution to explore the historical
foundations of this action in detail. Suffice it to say that it has developed
from Germanic roots and has been incorporated into and thereafter
adapted to form part of the Roman-Dutch common law.9 In fact, this
action is a very good example of law in motion, of law not being static
and being able to amend and adapt to changing times.10
In order to employ the remedy, the underlying rationale thereof
becomes relevant, namely whether there is a legal duty to support the
particular type of dependant who claims compensation for loss of
support.11 When considering this, factors like equity and decency must
also be taken into account. During the pre-constitutional era, the duty to
support requirement was generally linked to a valid marriage requirement
— in accordance with the boni mores at that point in time.
The general aim of the claim for maintenance in the negligent causation
of death of the breadwinner is to place the widow in the same financial
position that she would have been, had her husband not been killed.12 In
this sense, the remedy has a purely delictual point of departure: damages
in the case of wrongful conduct.13
2 2 Requirements for institution of remedy
The remedy will be available if the following requirements are met:14
. the claimant must establish that the deceased had a duty to support the
dependant;
. the duty had to be legally enforceable; and
. the dependant’s right to such support had to be worthy of protection.
When considering the last-mentioned element, the legal convictions of the
community are also relevant. In order to be successful with the claim, all
9 See for the historical development, Rautenbach & Du Plessis ‘‘The Extension of the Dependant’s
Action for Loss of Support and the Recognition of Muslim Marriages: the Saga Continues’’ 2000
THRHR 306-307; Davel Skadevergoeding aan Afhanklikes (1987) 46; Neethling, Potgieter & Visser Law
of Delict (1999) 10 283 and Victor v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd 1985 1 SA 118 (C).
10 See in this regard par 5 infra.
11 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (Commission for Gender Equity Intervening) 1999 4
SA 119 (SCA) par [10].
12 See also Clark & Kerr ‘‘Dependant’s Claim for Loss of Support: Are Women Married by Islamic Rites
Victims of Unfair Discrimination’’ 1999 SALJ 20-27 and the sources listed at 22-23.
13 Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (Commission for Gender Equity Intervening) supra
par [6].
14 See Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (Commission for Gender Equity Intervening)
supra par [10]; Santam Bpk v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA) 1326A-B.
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of the requirements have to be met.15 A contractual basis alone will not
constitute a duty to support.16
3 Development of the claim for support for specific widows
3 1 Customary wives
3 1 1 Nature and origin of duty to support
Customary marriages may be monogamous or polygynous. Irrespec-
tive of whether one or more than one wife is a partner in the marriage
relationship, the duty to support is a well-established principle.17
Section 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998
defines a customary marriage as ‘‘a marriage concluded in accordance
with customary law’’. ‘‘Customary law’’ is the ‘‘customs and usages
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South
Africa and which form part of the culture of those peoples’’.18 All
marriages that were validly entered into under customary law prior to 15
November 2000, irrespective of when they were concluded, are recognised
to be valid marriages for all purposes.19 The validity requirements for
customary marriages concluded after the commencement of the Act are
set out in section 3 thereof. Additional requirements are provided for in
the case of polygynous marriages concluded after 15 November 2000.20
Apart from the marriage relationship that gives rise to a duty to support,
adoption in accordance with customary law21 also constitutes a valid
duty to support:
‘‘Adoption is recognised by customary law. The question is whether, although there was such a
duty under customary law, it is a legal duty. This depends on whether such a duty is legally
15 The requirements in Amod were set out as follows: it had to be proven (a) that the deceased had a
legally enforceable duty to support the dependant; (b) that it was arising from a solemn marriage in
accordance with the tenets of recognised and accepted faith; and (c) that it was a duty which deserved
recognition and protection for the purposes of the dependant’s claim.
16 Confirmed in Amod supra and emphasised in Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 3 SA 1142 (T). The duty
to support, which may be embodied in a contract, also needs to be linked with another relationship, be
it that of a marriage relationship or that of a parent-child relationship. See for more detail in this
regard Neethling ‘‘Aksie van Afhanklikes: Bemoeiing met ’n Kontraktuele Onderhoudsplig’’ 2002
TSAR 156-160. As early as 1961, the court found that a duty to support embodied in a contract alone
would lead to an ‘‘unmanageable situation’’ Nkabinde v SA Motor and General Insurance Co Ltd
1961 1 SA 302 (N).
17 See for more detail concerning the nature and consequences of customary marriages, Bennett
Customary Law of South Africa (2004) ch 8; Mqeke & Church Law of Persons, Family in LAWSA
XXXII: Indigenous Law (2004) pars 106-107; Dlamini Family Law in Bekker, Labuschagne & Vorster
(eds) Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa vol 1: Customary Law (2002) ch 3.
18 S 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998.
19 S 2(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. Polygynous marriages contracted
before 15 November 2000 are recognised in s 2(3) of the Recognition Act.
20 See s 7(6). This entails that the husband needs to make an application to the court to approve the
written contract entered into by all interested parties with regard to the future proprietary
consequences of the marriage. In such an application the court needs to (a) terminate the existing
matrimonial property system applicable to the marriage and (b) effect the division of the matrimonial
property see s 7(7)(a).
21 See in detail Nkala ‘‘Stepchildren and the Duty to Support on the Death of the Breadwinner in
Customary Law and Common Law’’ Aug 2004 De Rebus 22-24.
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enforceable. There is no reason why such a duty which accords with tribal customs would not
be enforceable. The deceased’s obligation to support is not contrary to public policy or
opposed to the principles of natural justice.’’22
In relation to adoption, the question is thus whether a valid adoption
had occurred, which forms the legal source or origin for a legally
enforceable duty to support.23 In Metiso v Padongelukfonds,24 the court
held that a customary duty of support should be recognised in civil law.
In that case the ‘‘best interest of the child’’ and the negative consequences
of non-recognition of the adoption and the duty to support flowing
therefrom, were also considered.25
3 1 2 Historical overview: before 1963
3 1 2 1 Position in KwaZulu Natal
Customary law generally draws no clear distinctions between delicts on
the one hand and crimes on the other.26 The unlawful causation of death
of another person traditionally did not give rise to delictual liability in
customary law. Originally manslaughter and homicide were deemed to be
in the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal chief. Normally a part of the
customary fine imposed by the chief would be allocated to the deceased’s
relatives. The dependants themselves did not, however, institute claims
for damages.
This changed in 1901 with Sipongomana v Nkuku,27 decided in
KwaZulu-Natal. Here the court found that, if a valid customary
marriage was concluded, a personal claim for maintenance of the wife
and children could be instituted under customary law.28
3 1 2 2 The rest of the country
In all of the other provinces a claim for maintenance, based on the duty
to support, was only possible if instituted in accordance with the common
law principles. That implied that all the common law (Roman-Dutch)
requirements had to be met. The point of departure was that such a claim
was only possible if the duty to support was acknowledged. Such a duty
to support only resulted from a valid marriage of one man and one
woman. Since customary marriages were potentially polygynous and
accordingly against public policy and furthermore did not meet the
22 Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 4 SA 771 (TkA) 776.
23 See also Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 (T).
24 2001 3 SA 1142 (T).
25 See the criticism of Bonthuys ‘‘The South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law’’
2002 SALJ 760 of the decision that the courts did not develop the customary rule which did not
require the mother’s consent before adoption could take place.
26 Cf Olivier Law of Delict 2004 in LAWSA XXXII: Indigenous Law pars 212-217.
27 1901 NHC 26.
28 See in this regard Olivier LAWSA XXXII par 216; Rautenbach & Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 302-304
306-308.
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requirements of the Marriage Act,29 these marriages were thus not
recognised as valid unions.30
A duty to support would only be enforceable if the defendant accepted
and recognised it. A black defendant recognised and acknowledged both
the customary marriage and the concomitant duty to support.31 In all
instances where the defendants were non-blacks, the problems identified
supra would resurface, thus prohibiting a widow to claim for support.32
Numerous attempts in case law to eradicate the prohibition and to enable
widows to institute claims, irrespective of the racial and cultural background
of the defendant,were all unsuccessful in attempting to shift the common law
boundaries.33 These decisions, without exception, confirmed that
. customary marriages were not recognised;
. the duty to support — although recognised by black parties — could
not be enforced against non-black parties;
. it was irrelevant whether the marriage partners had a mutual duty to
support each other and in fact supported each other;
. the Roman-Dutch law was the only set of requirements to be
considered; and
. a contract stipulating mutual support duties for black customary
partners still did not provide a basis for a general recognition of the
duty to support — only a valid marriage or recognised family
relationship would suffice.
3 1 3 Position after 1963
The problems facing women married in accordance with customary law
attempting to institute adependant’s claimwere eventually acknowledgedby
the legislature in 1963with the promulgation of section 31 of the Black Laws
Amendment Act 76 of 1963. This section is still the relevant mechanism to
realise these claims34 and is discussed in more detail in par 4 1 infra.
Black South Africans could, however, also enter into common law
marriages governed by the Marriage Act and the Black Administration
Act 38 of 1927.35 In cases of negligent deaths of husbands in these
29 Marriage Act 125 of 1961 and its predecessors.
30 Cf also Rautenbach & Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 302; Bennett Customary Law in South Africa 188-192;
Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A).
31 Olivier LAWSA XXXII par 216.
32 Eg Mokwena v Laub 1943 WLD 63.
33 Zulu v Minister of Justice 1956 2 SA 128 (W); Santam v Fondo 1960 2 SA 467 (A); Nkabinde v SA
Motor & General Insurance 1961 1 SA 302 (D).
34 Road Accident Fund v Mongalo 2003 1 ALL SA 72 (SCA) confirmed that s 4 of the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 has not replaced s 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act. S 4 of
the Recognition Act provides for the registration of customary marriages. Such registration is,
however, not a validity requirement and does not impact negatively on the marriage relationship if it
had not been complied with.
35 S 22 laid down very specific provisions regarding black persons who entered into civil marriages. These
requirements were amended in 1988 under the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment
Act 3 of 1988 and finally repealed by the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. Ss 3(2)
and 19(1) of the Recognition of Customary marriages Act 120 of 1998 now regulate this issue.
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instances widows had no problems instituting claims based on an
acknowledged duty to support — irrespective of the racial and cultural
background of the defendant.
3 2 Development of the claim for support for Muslim wives
3 2 1 Nature of marriage
One of the basic Islamic legal concepts evolves around the concept of
duty and embodies and promotes the notions of sharing and caring.36
An Islamic marriage is both a contract and a religious institution with
a religious purpose.37 Since the family forms the nucleus of the
community, marriage is generally encouraged in the Muslim commu-
nity.38 Muslim marriages may generally only be concluded by persons
belonging to the Islamic faith (or by Muslim males and non-Muslim
females). The content and responsibilities of the marriage are interpreted
in terms of the Shari-ah.39
One of the unavoidable consequences of a Muslim marriage is that the
husband has to support the wife, irrespective of whether the wife has her
own income. If that is indeed the case, the husband still has to see to her
general well-being. The duty to support also extends to the children born
from the marriage.40 A woman married under Islamic law is therefore
entitled to reasonable maintenance during the marriage as well as during
the iddah period upon divorce.41
Polygynous marriages may also be entered into in accordance with
Muslim law. Depending on the financial means and the ability of the
husband to provide for the wives fairly, a maximum of four wives may be
married.42
In the Amod case,43 the court confirmed that the Muslim marriage was:
‘‘contracted according to the tenets of a major religion; and that it involved ‘a very public
ceremony, special formalities and onerous obligations for both parents in terms of the relevant
rules of Islamic law applicable’’’.
As Rautenbach & Du Plessis44 correctly point out, the obligation to
36 Gokul, Bernhard, Du Plessis, Gollam & Heyns General Foundations in Rautenbach & Goolam
Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Religious and Legal Systems (2002) 19.
37 Rautenbach & Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 308; Hodkinson Muslim Family Law (1984) 89; Pearl A
Textbook on Muslim Personal Law (1987) 58; Coulson A History of Islamic Law (1991) 189-190;
Schacht An Introduction to Islamic Law (1991) 22.
38 The essence of marriage is like the relationship between the human body and the garment it wears
Gokul, Goldstein, Goolam, Badat & Moosa Law of Marriage in Rautenbach & Goolam Religious and
Legal Systems 61. This is in accordance with ch 30 verse 21 and ch 2 verse 187 of the Holy Qur’an.
39 See Rautenbach & Du Plessis 2000 THRHR 308 for an exposition on the differences between marriage
as a civil contract and marriage as a religious institution.
40 Gokul et al Law of Marriage 64-65.
41 Clark & Kerr 1999 SALJ 22-23.
42 Gokul et al Law of Marriage 74.
43 Supra par [20].
44 2000 THRHR 309.
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support is not only based on the contractual nature of the marriage, but
is intrinsically linked with its religious foundation.
3 2 2 Historical overview
Development in this regard has occurred piecemeal by way of case
law.45 The same arguments that were raised against the recognition of the
dependant’s claim in the case of customary marriages were employed
with regard to Muslim marriages:
. the marriage did not enjoy the status of a marriage in civil law; and
. any legal duty which the deceased had to support the appellant was a
contractual consequence of the union and not an ex lege consequence
of the marriage per se.
The point of departure was that these marriages, being potentially
polygynous, were contra bonos mores.46 The duty to support was thus
inextricably linked to the existence of a valid marriage, which criterion
was laid down by the common law in (at that stage) an intolerant boni
mores environment.
First movements in the direction of a more tolerant boni mores
environment took place in 1997 with the Ryland v Edros47 decision. The
failure to accept the existing marriage contract, which arose from a valid
monogamous marriage relationship concluded in terms of the Muslim
rites and religion, because it was not in line with one specific group’s
concept of what constitutes a marriage, was found to be unacceptable in
the new constitutional dispensation:
‘‘it is inimical to all the values of the new South Africa for one group to impose its values on
another and that the Courts should only brand a contract as offensive to public policy if it is
offensive to those values which are shared by the community at large, by all right-thinking
people in the community and not only by one section of it’’. 48
The effect of this case was, however, limited since it only provided for
the recognition of the duty to support claim and only in relation to de
facto monogamous marriages.
45 See in general, Mahomed ‘‘Another Landmark Decision in Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle
Accident Fund [1999] 4 ALL SA 421 (A)’’ Jan 2000 De Rebus 8; Maenetje ‘‘Motor Vehicle Accidents
and the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund Act 93 of 1989’’ 2000 Juta’s Business Law vol 8 74-
81; Jacobs ‘‘Enforcement of Contractual Obligations Flowing from a Potentially Polygamous Muslim
Marriage which was in Fact Monogamous Ryland v Edros 1997 (2) SA 690 (C)’’ 1998 Codicillus vol
34 68-70; O’Sullivan ‘‘Upholding the Property Rights of Women Married According to Muslim Rites’’
Community Law Centre Sept 2004 ESR Review 10-13; Clark & Kerr 1999 SALJ 20-27; Freedman
‘‘Islamic Marriages, the Duty to Support and the Application of the Bill of Rights’’ 1998 THRHR 532-
538; Goldblatt ‘‘Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA)’’ 2000
SAJHR 138-144; Maithufi ‘‘Recognition and Protection of Duty to Support between Partners to an
Islamic Marriage’’ 2000 De Jure 383; Neethling & Potgieter 2001 THRHR 484-488; Bonthuys ‘‘The
South African Bill of Rights and the Development of Family Law’’ 2002 SALJ 748-782; Rautenbach
‘‘Islamic Marriages in South Africa: Quo Vadimus?’’ 2003 Koers 121-152.
46 Ismail v Ismail 1983 1 SA 1006 (A).
47 1997 2 SA 690 (C) especially 707E-H.
48 Ryland v Edros supra 707H.
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Despite these legal developments, the full consequences of a Muslim
marriage had not yet been acknowledged or legally recognised at that
stage. However, the shift towards a more tolerant boni mores environ-
ment had certainly gained momentum. In 1999, Santam Bpk v Henery,49
as eluded to by Mahomed CJ in Amod v Multilateral Vehicle Accident
Fund50 divorced the ‘‘duty to support requirement’’ from the ‘‘valid
marriage requirement’’:
‘‘In my view, the correct approach is not to ask whether the customary marriage was lawful at
common law or not to enquire whether or not the deceased was under a legal duty to support
the appellant during the subsistence of the marriage. . .’’
According to the Amod decision the legal questions were thus: was
there a duty to support and did it deserve recognition and protection by
law?51 Mahomed CJ found both in the affirmative.
3 2 3 A change in the boni mores
What has thus happened, since Ismail v Ismail52 decided in 1983, for
the courts to ‘‘re-discover’’ that the existing common law remedy also
incorporates claims from Muslim widows? The pre-constitutional
paradigm linked the duty to support requirement inextricably with the
valid marriage requirement which was ‘‘recognised by one faith or
philosophy to the exclusion of others’’.53 Even before the formal
adoption of the interim Constitution in 1993 a ‘‘new ethos of tolerance,
pluralism and religious freedom’’ had consolidated itself in the
community. This new ethos is light years removed from the intolerant
approach regarding marriages which did not accord with the assumptions
of the culturally and politically dominant establishment of that time.
The change in the boni mores subsequently also manifested itself in a
corresponding change in the application of the law:
‘‘the common law is not to be trapped within the limitations of its past’’.54
Although references were made to the evolving boni mores, constitu-
tional values and underlying norms were not explored fully by the court
in the Amod case. The non-recognition of Muslim marriages and the
reflection thereof on equality, human dignity and the right to religious
freedom were categorically ignored. 55
With regard to the question which mechanism should be used to
change the application of the law, Mahomed CJ56 stated that:
49 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA).
50 Supra par [19].
51 Supra 1330E.
52 1983 1 SA 1006 (A).
53 Amod v Multilateral Vehicle Accident Fund supra 1328B.
54 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) par [86].
55 See for more detail Bonthuys 2002 SALJ 761-763 777-779; Rautenbach & Du Plessis 2000 THRHR
309.
56 Amod v Multilateral Vehicle Accident Fund supra 1331G-1332D.
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‘‘I have no doubt that it would be perfectly proper for the Legislature to enact such legislation
if it considered it necessary, but it does not follow that the Courts should not interpret and
develop the common law to accommodate this need if it was consistent with the relevant
common-law principles which regulate the objectives and the proper ambit of the dependant’s
claim in Roman-Dutch law. . .the legal certainty of the claim can be assessed purely on the
proper application of common-law principles of application to the dependant’s action without
any reference to any religious doctrine or policy’’.57
4 Mechanism for the realisation of claim
4 1 Customary marriages: section 31 of Black Laws Amendment Act
76 of 1963
Section 31 is hereby reproduced in full, after which an analysis of the
section follows:
‘‘(1) A partner to a customary union as defined in section thirty-five of the Black
Administration Act, 1927 (Act 38 of 1927), shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be
entitled to claim damages for loss of support from any person who unlawfully causes the death
of the other partner to such union or is legally liable in respect thereof, provided such partner
or such other partner is not at the time of such death a party to a subsisting marriage.
(2) No such claim for damages shall be enforceable by any person who claims to be a partner
to a customary union with such deceased partner, unless
(a) such person produces a certificate issued by a Commissioner stating the name of the
partner, or in the case of a union with more than one woman, the names of the partners,
with whom the deceased partner had entered into a customary union which was still in
existence at the time of death of the deceased partner; and
(b) such person’s name appears on such certificate.
(2A) A certificate referred to in subsection (2) shall be accepted as conclusive proof of the
existence of a customary union of the deceased partner and the partner or, in the case of a
union with more than one woman, the partners whose name or names appear on such
certificate.
(3) Where it appears from the certificate referred to in subsection (2) that the deceased partner
was survived by more than one partner to a customary union, all such surviving partners who
desire to claim damages for loss of support, shall be joined as plaintiffs in one action.
(4) (a) Where any action is instituted under this section against any person by a partner to a
customary union and it appears from the certificate referred to in subsection (2) that the
deceased partner was survived by a partner to a customary union who has not been joined as a
plaintiff, such person may serve a notice on such partner who has not been joined as a plaintiff
to intervene in the action as a co-plaintiff within a period of not less than fourteen days nor
more than one month specified in such notice, and thereupon the action shall be stayed for the
period so specified.
(b) If any partner to a customary union upon whom a notice has been served in terms of
paragraph (a), fails to intervene in the action within the period specified in such notice or
within such extended period as the court on good cause shown may allow, such partner shall be
deemed to have abandoned her claim.
(5) If a deceased partner to a customary union is survived by more than one partner to such
a union, the aggregate of the amounts of the damages to be awarded to such partners in terms
of this section shall under no circumstances exceed the amount which would have been
awarded had the deceased partner been survived by only one partner to a customary union.
(6) A partner to a customary union whose name has been omitted from a certificate issued
57 See especially Bonthuys’ criticism on the court’s finding that the issue does not involve ‘‘any difficult
policy and political choices’’ 2002 SALJ 776. Her valid criticism is that these are indeed issues that the
court should have explored, despite commending the final conclusion reached by the court in this
decision.
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by a Commissioner in terms of subsection (2) shall not by reason of such omission have any
claim against the Government of the Republic or the Commissioner if such omission was made
bona fide.
(7) Nothing in this section contained shall be construed as affecting in any manner the
procedure prescribed in any other law to be followed in the institution of a claim for damages
for loss of support.’’
4 1 1 Analysis of section 31
4 1 1 1 The objectives of section 31
As set out above, the main aim of the action to claim maintenance is to
place the widow in the same financial position that she would have been,
had her husband not been killed. Section 31’s main objective thus is to
enable the widow to institute such a claim. Generally the objectives of
section 31 are fourfold:58
. To provide a legal mechanism to institute a claim for damages since
widows from customary marriages were only able to institute such
claims if the defendant accepted and acknowledged the duty to
support. In practice this meant that the claim could only be instituted
successfully against black defendants.
. To limit the amount of damages.59 Irrespective of the number of wives
or children involved, the underlying idea was to place widows of
customary marriages on par with widows from common law
marriages. Since common law marriages are limited to one man and
one woman, there is no possibility of more than one wife claiming for
damages. That entailed that the claim for damages had to be limited:
the amount claimed cannot be more because there was more than one
wife involved.
. To limit time and costs involved.60 Being potentially polygynous, more
than one plaintiff may be involved in the proceedings. Section 31,
however, provides that only one action be instituted. The joining of
claimants therefore prevents duplication of actions and costs and aims
to be more expedient.
. To indemnify the State and functionaries from claims that might arise
form the bona fide omission of plaintiffs’ names from certificates.61
It is ironic that polygyny, the root of the ‘‘problem’’ concerning
recognition of customary marriages and consequential duty to support,
has effectively been sidelined in section 31. Although it acknowledges the
idea of polygyny it negates its effect in practice. Put differently, the
consequences of polygyny have not been incorporated to the benefit of
58 Taken from Labuschagne & Van den Heever Law of Delict in Bekker, Labuschagne & Vorster (eds)
Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Customary Law (2002) 102. See also Olivier LAWSA
XXXII par 219.
59 S 31(5).
60 S 31(1)-(4) and (7).
61 S 31(6).
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the claimant(s) — they have, however, been incorporated to the benefit of
the defendant.
The above objectives do not take into account that section 31 was
drafted before the commencement of a Bill of Rights which has since then
led to the promulgation of legislation specifically legalising polygyny. A
mechanism like this should therefore has as one of its aims to give effect
also to the full consequences of polygyny.
4 1 1 2 The formulation of section 31
Road Accident Fund v Mongalo62 has confirmed that section 4 of the
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 has not substituted
section 31 as the mechanism to institute the dependant’s claim. The
certificate to which section 31 refers is not a referral to the certificate that
now proves the existence of a valid customary marriage. The Black
Administration Act provides that a certificate issued by a Commissioner
shall be accepted as conclusive proof of the existence of a customary
marriage. Not only is the concept of section 31 a remnant from the pre-
constitutional era, so too is the specific text and formulation. The
provision still contains references to a ‘‘customary union’’, thereby
reflecting the pre-2000 legal position when customary marriages were still
considered unions and not marriages. Further references are to the Black
Administration Act — section 31 has no references to the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act as such. Perhaps the time has come to rethink
not only the specific formulation of the text, but the use in principle of
this provision in a post-constitutional era.
4 1 1 3 The certificate requirement
The function of the certificate is generally fourfold:
. it has evidential value;
. it determines locus standi;
. it enables the defendant to raise certain defences; and
. it enables the court to determine the amount of maintenance.63
Since claims may only be instituted if the claimant is in possession of a
certificate, case law had to deal with different aspects flowing from the
certificate requirement. The registration of a customary marriage has not
been and still is not a validity requirement.64 Thus, even though
legislation makes reference to the issue of these certificates, there is no
legally enforceable duty to have a marriage registered, thereby
automatically providing for the said certificate to be issued.
62 2003 1 ALL SA 72 (SCA).
63 See also Labuschagne & Van den Heever Law of Delict in Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South
Africa: Customary Law (2002) 103.
64 S 4 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 provides for the registration of
marriages, but it is not obligatory.
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Pre-2000 case law has also confirmed that no substitute for the
certificate would be acceptable, not even an affidavit providing that the
couple had been married and that a duty to support had existed. 65
Exactly when the certificate has to be submitted, has still not been
resolved in case law. Since one of the aims of the certificate is to form the
basis of locus standi for the plaintiff(s) and is prima facie proof of the
marriage, it would make sense to submit the certificate before trial in
order for the defendant to get the opportunity to prepare to contest the
certificate, if necessary.
Although the certificate is ‘‘conclusive proof’’ of the existence of a
customary marriage, case law has now made it clear that fraudulently
acquired certificates would not be acceptable. Nkabinde v Road Accident
Fund66 found that the validity of a certificate may be disputed: a statutory
provision that a document constituted conclusive proof of a state of
affairs would not immunise the document from attack on the basis that it
was fraudulently acquired. Due to the fact that the quantum of damages is
restricted,67 the effect of a fraudulently acquired certificate could be that
the lawful partners in a customary marriage would have to share the
damages with a person who is not really a partner. Again, the obligation
to register marriages may go a long way in eliminating fraudulent claims
in this regard.
4 1 1 4 Limiting of claims and damages
As mentioned before, one of the aims of section 31 is to limit the
proceedings so that one action only is instituted. In this regard two
distinctive sets of questions may be posed:
. what would the case be had the name of one of the plaintiffs been on
the certificate, but the defendant omitted to join her in the action? and
. what would the case be if the name of one of the plaintiffs had been
omitted from the certificate — despite the existence of a valid
customary marriage? Essentially the question is: would it be possible
to institute a further claim against the specific defendant?
With regard to the first scenario where the name was on the certificate,
but the defendant refrained from joining her in the action, section 31(5)
would prevent a further action due to the fact that the amount of
damages is limited to what the amount would be had only one wife been
involved. A further claim would thus not have any practical or financial
implications for either the plaintiff or the defendant. In these
circumstances the widows would probably have to come to some kind
of agreement between themselves as to how the amount of damages is to
be divided.
65 Olivier LAWSA XXXII par 218.
66 2003 1 ALL SA 72 (SCA).
67 See par 4 1 1 1 supra and par 4 1 1 4 infra.
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In the second scenario where a name was omitted, the defendant is not
to be blamed — he or she had no knowledge of the existence of the
further wife. If the name was omitted mala fides by a State official, then a
claim for damages could be instituted by the widow since government is
only indemnified against bona fide mistakes.68 Since the amount of
damages is limited anyway to the amount that would have been claimed if
there were only one plaintiff, no more compensation would be claimable
in principle. Thus, irrespective of whether her name had been omitted
bona or mala fide, there is no further possibility to institute a claim
against that particular defendant. Depending on the circumstances, a
claim for damages against the State is, however, possible.
4 1 1 5 Calculation of damages
The calculation of damages is intricate.69 The underlying idea is to
place the claimant in the same financial position she would have been had
the husband not been killed. In determining damages, various factors are
considered, inter alia the age and general health of the deceased, his
estimated life span and income and the possibility for the claimant to
remarry. This last factor has also undergone some development under
common law.70
With regard to customary wives, the calculation is even more
complicated, since courts tend to take into account both customary
and common law factors. The fact that the widow may be supported by
the extended family under customary law is also taken into account,
thereby diminishing the actual amount of damages granted.71
Polygynous families pose certain unique complexities: the ranking and
position of wives vary, their needs and the number and needs of their
respective children differ. Section 31 gives no indication as to how the
actual calculation is to take place or how the needs of different wives are
to be balanced.
4 1 1 6 Beneficiaries
Section 31 is only limited to persons married in accordance with
customary law. Until 1988 it was quite possible that persons could be
68 S 31(6).
69 Clark & Kerr 1999 SALJ 22-24.
70 It is generally held that a widow loses her claim for loss of support as soon as she remarries Glas v
Santam Insurance Ltd 1992 1 SA 901 (W). The reason for that is that she is then maintained by the new
husband. Evidence that the new husband is financially worse off than the deceased, is irrelevant. The
correctness of this approach was investigated in Ongevallekommissaris v Santam Bpk 1999 1 SA 251
(A). If the action for loss of support is heard before she remarries, the chances of her remarrying are
factored into the calculation of the amount claimed. In this case it was found that, had the widow
remarried, evidence that her second husband was less able to support her should be allowed in order to
compensate her adequately. The motivation for this change was that the aim of the action was to place
her in the same financial position she had been before the death of her husband. Even after re-marriage,
if her position is not equated to that before the death of her first husband, the ‘‘negative impact’’ of the
second marriage had to be considered.
71 Olivier LAWSA XXXII par 215.
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partners in both customary and civil marriages.72 Section 31-relief was
not available if either partner to the customary marriage was also a party
to a civil marriage. Due to the non-recognition of customary marriages
before 2000, the civil marriage merely ‘‘dissolved’’ the customary
marriage. In the case of death of the (former) husband, the ‘‘widow’’
lost her section 31-claim. In these circumstances only the civil law widow
would be able to claim support in terms of the common law.
4 2 Mechanism for realisation of claims: Muslim wives
In accordance with the Amod73 case it is now clear that the common
law remedy is also the relevant mechanism to realise Muslim widows’
claims, but only in relation to monogamous marriages. Arguments that
Muslim couples still have the opportunity to solemnise marriages in
terms of the Marriage Act74 and are thus not discriminated against on the
basis of religion, leave out of the equation that the Marriage Act of 1961
still only provides for monogamous marriages. Solemnisation under civil
law therefore poses no real solution, instead, it emphasises the underlying
problem and its pre-occupation with monogamous marriages.
The extension of the common law remedy to include these claims is not
based on the existence of a contract alone that provides for a duty to
support.75 The contract has to be linked with another relationship, be it
that of husband or wife or that of parent and child, for example.
The common law remedy has common law limitations. The major
short-coming in this regard, as already alluded to above, is the fact that it
is only available to monogamous partnerships. When the Draft Muslim
Marriages Bill, which affords recognition to monogamous and poly-
gynous Muslim marriages, commences, widows from polygynous
marriages will still be left out in the cold in the case of a wrongful
death of a husband. Despite recognition of polygynous marriages in
theory, full consequences from these marriages are thus not provided for
by the present-day common law.
5 Possible way forward
As early as 1911 the then Appeal Court76 found that the dependant’s
72 It was not uncommon for a man to have a civil law wife in urban areas and a customary wife in rural
areas see Bennett Customary Law in South Africa 239. This dual marriage system was abolished by
the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Amendment Act 3 of 1988. The Amendment Act did not
apply in the former four national states Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda which
meant that the dual system was perpetuated there for a while longer. In the rest of South Africa after
1988 the husband would have had to declare that he was not a partner in a customary marriage before
he concluded a civil marriage s 22(1) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. This entailed that
men had to dissolve customary marriages before entering into civil marriages.
73 Supra par [24].
74 S 29A of the Marriage Act see also Hahlo Husband and Wife 31-32.
75 Amod case supra par [26]. Arguments were raised that if the duty to support could be contracted, it
would unacceptably widen the scope of the dependant’s claim in common law.
76 Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 1911 AD 657.
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claim for support was a flexible remedy which needed to be adapted to
modern conditions and that, in determining the process of adaptation,
regard must be had to the rationale of the remedy, which was to afford
relief to dependants whom the deceased had a legal duty to support —
even if the duty arose from natural law.77 Since both decency and boni
mores have in the past been considered in the development of the
common law, this remedy has in fact been adapted by allowing for claims
in the following instances:
. by a husband for loss of support after the death of his wife;78
. by a husband for loss of support arising from injury caused to his
wife;79 and
. by a divorcee who had received maintenance from her former husband
prior to his death.80
Apart from the very distinctive historical evolution of this particular
remedy, which intrinsically involved internal development, the Constitu-
tion also provides for the development of common law in certain
circumstances. Adapting or developing the common law in this regard is
thus a real and definite possibility. The other option is to promulgate
legislation.
5 1 Development of the common law
Section 35(3) of the interim Constitution and section 39(2)81 of the
final Constitution enjoins courts to develop the common law. TheMetiso
case has already indicated that some courts are willing to rethink the
common law foundations of the remedy with the result that common law
concepts and customary law concepts — especially in view of the best
interest of the child — can be interwoven, all finally falling under the
common law umbrella. With regard to Muslim widows, the Amod case
has indeed redefined the remedy in that common law has been ‘‘re-
stated’’ to include de facto monogamous Muslim marriages. As pointed
out by Goldblatt,82 even Roman-Dutch sources had indicated that the
remedy is available to dependants like ‘‘wife, children and the like’’ and
to those whom the deceased was ‘‘accustomed to support’’.83 The point of
77 See also Maenetje 2000 Juta’s Business Law vol 8 part 2 74-81 80.
78 Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke supra.
79 Abbott v Bergman 1922 AD 35.
80 Santam Bpk v Henery 1999 3 SA 421 (SCA).
81 ‘‘When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’’ Read with
ss 8(2) and (3)(a) of the Constitution: ‘‘when applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or
juristic person in terms of section (a), a court
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law
to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right. . .’’.
82 2000 SAJHR 142.
83 Santam Bpk v Henery supra par [7].
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departure should thus rather be to determine the duty to support in
accordance with the particular family structure.
With regard to the development of common law, two possibilities may
be explored:
. The first is to extend the common law claim to include de facto
monogamous customary marriages. The same arguments for the
extension of common law to include Muslim marriages can be used to
include customary marriages. This option has the result that de facto
monogamous customary and Muslim marriages are dealt with by the
common law. Common law remedies will thus apply to all
monogamous marriages — civil, customary and Muslim-oriented. De
facto polygynous customary marriages will in these circumstances thus
still be dealt with by section 31 of the Black Laws Amendment Act. If
section 31 thus remains in place, the practical and theoretical short-
comings and problems, discussed above, will have to be dealt with as
well. This could, inter alia, entail amending the Recognition of
Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 by making registration of
customary marriages obligatory. A lacuna will then still remain with
regard to de facto polygynous Muslim marriages.
. The other possibility is to re-conceptualise what is understood under
‘‘marriage’’ and thereby developing family common law. ‘‘Marriage’’
as such is not defined in the 1961 Marriage Act. Before the
commencement of the Constitution, the traditional approach, as
embodied in the definition of Hahlo,84 was still adhered to by the
courts. The commencement of the Constitution, however, also
heralded a more tolerant boni mores environment. Apart from these
very distinctive developments, the promulgation and commencement
of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act in 2000 and the
publication of the SA Law Commission’s Report on Islamic Marriages
and Related Matters in July 2003 and the drafting of the Muslim
Marriages Bill amended the family law playing field further.
Since 15 November 2000 polygynous marriages are a practical and legal
reality for persons who live in accordance with customary law. The
Recognition Act recognises customary marriages ‘‘for all purposes’’.85
Arguably this should also relate to duty to support-actions.With regard to
Muslimmarriages, clause 2 provides that theMuslimMarriagesBill applies
to all existing marriages entered into in terms of Muslim law —
monogamous as well as polygynous. As soon as the Bill passes through
parliament and commences, polygynous marriages will also be a reality —
in its full sense — for the Muslim community.86 If the concept of polygyny
84 The South African Law of Husband and Wife (1985) 29.
85 Despite this provision, customary marriages were not recognised for intestate succession purposes
under the Intestate Law of Succession Act 81 of 1987 until the well-known case of Bhe v Magistrate,
Khayelitsha, Shibi v Sithole, SA Human Rights Commission v President of the RSA 2005 1 SA 580 (CC).
86 If a man currently a partner in a Muslim marriage wants to marry a further wife, the requirements of cl
8(5) and (6) have to be met as well, apart from the general validity requirements set out in cl 5 of the Bill.
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has been accepted and legally recognised in legislation, in accordance with
the Constitution,87 the full consequences would have to be recognised as
well. Full consequences would also entail claims by widows from
polygynous customary and Muslim marriages. Already the door has been
opened to claims resulting frommonogamousMuslimmarriages; it has not
necessarily been closed to polygynous Muslim marriages:
‘‘I do not thereby whish to be understood as saying that, if the deceased had been party to a
plurality of continuing unions, his dependants would necessarily fail in a dependant’s action
based on any duty which the deceasedmight have towards such dependants. I prefer to leave that
issue entirely open. Arguments arising from the relationship between the values of equality and
religious freedom nowarticulated in theConstitution but consolidated in the immediate period
preceding the interim Constitution might influence the proper resolution of that issue.’’88
If the re-conceptualisation of marriage takes place in accordance with
the Constitution, it could result in the common law remedy being
employed for all duty to support cases.89
5 2 Introduction of legislation
In the absence of development of common law to provide for one of
the above possibilities, the drafting of legislation is suggested. Various
options may be explored:
. formulating a legislative mechanism similar to section 31 for Muslim
marriages and amending the existing section 31 to bemore in line with the
new constitutional dispensation.90 This option provides for two separate
legislative mechanisms: one for customary wives and one for Muslim
widows; or
. formulating a legislative mechanism that provides for the dependant’s
claim for widows of polygynous marriages. Thus, one mechanism for
widows involved in polygynousmarriages to address their specific, unique
circumstances — irrespective of the particular cultural or religious
background.
It is clear, however, that the passage of the Muslim Marriages Bill
through parliament alone will not address the plight of widows from
polygynous marriages with regard to the dependant’s claim. Specific
legislative intervention or the development of common law, as eluded to
above, is essential in this regard.
Due to the fact that the South African development of family law has
been piecemeal and sometimes erratic with no specific synergy between
87 S 15(3) of the final Constitution specifically provides for the promulgation of legislation dealing with
religion based legal systems and marriage.
88 Amod case supra par [24].
89 This option would inevitably result in the repeal of s 31 as the mechanism to institute duty to support
claims. This would be in line with the point of departure that the Recognition Act recognises
customary marriages ‘‘for all purposes’’.
90 This option would obviously not be possible if the common law is developed to provide for one
remedy for all applicants, irrespective of background or religion.
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the various levels of courts and or objectives of development,91 it is
perhaps more expedient to draft legislation to effect suggested changes.
6 Conclusion
The duty to support with regard to religion-based and cultural-based
marriages has already been recognised in legislation in relation to
customary marriages and in case law with regard to Muslim marriages.
Moving from that point of departure and combining it with legislative
recognition of polygynous marriages in the case of customary law and
draft provisions in relation to Muslim marriages, the boundaries of
traditional concepts of marriage and family have been challenged and
extended accordingly. That challenge continues.
The focus needs to be on the particular family structure and on the
concomitant duty to support in that regard. To cling to the pre-
occupation with monogamous marriages not only negates the constitu-
tional call to develop law in line with the underlying constitutional
principles and ideals, it also ignores the very existence of thousands of
families in South Africa. It is high time that these marriages enjoy full
recognition, thereby endorsing all of its consequences — including
dependants’ claims based on the duty to support.
OPSOMMING
Tesame met die afdwinging van erfopvolgingsregte is die suksesvolle instel van die aksie van die
afhanklike by die nalatige doodsveroorsaking van die broodwinner ’n belangrike manier waarop ’n
weduwee ekonomiese afhanklikheid na die afsterwe van haar gade kan verkry.Weens die potensieel
poligame aard van Swart gewoonteregtelike enMoslem-huwelike, is hierdie huwelike aanvanklik nie
as wettige huwelike aanvaar nie. Gevolglik is die plig tot onderhoud tussen hierdie gades ook nie
aanvaar nie, wat dit vir weduwees uit hierdie huwelike onmoontlik gemaak het om suksesvolle aksies
van die afhanklike na afsterwe van hul gades in te stel. In hierdie artikel word die historiese aanloop
van die meganismes wat mettertyd ontwikkel is, hetsy deur ingrype van die wetgewer of deur
ontwikkeling in regspraak, uiteengesit en ontleed. Hoewel die posisie van weduwees van
gewoonteregtelike huwelike deur artikel 31 van die Wysigingswet op Swart Wetgewing 76 van
1963 aangespreek is, is daar in hierdie remedie, wat uit die voor-grondwetlike bedeling dateer,
heelwat tekortkominge.Wat die posisie vanMoslem-weduwees betref, het ’n ‘‘herbevinding’’ van die
gemenereg na ’n jarelange stryd in regspraak daartoe gelei dat die gemeenregtelike aksie van die
afhanklike uitgebrei is om ’n weduwee van ’n de facto monogame huwelik in te sluit ten spyte
daarvan dat Moslem-huwelike nog nie as wettige huwelike beskou word nie. Daar word aangevoer
dat die tyd ryp is om die instel van die aksie van die afhanklike by gewoonteregtelike en Moslem-
huwelike in heroe¨nskou te neem in die lig van die inwerkingtreding van die Wet op Erkenning van
Gewoonteregtelike Huwelike 120 van 1998 enersyds en die oorwegings van die Muslim Marriages
Bill van 2003 andersyds. Selfs al word laasgenoemde wetsontwerp aanvaar en in werking gestel, laat
dit steeds ’n leemte vir weduwees in poligame huwelike waar die aksie van die afhanklike ter sprake
kom. Daar word gevolglik aan die hand gedoen dat die ontwikkeling van die gemenereg in die
algemeen en die aanpassing van die definisie van ‘‘huwelik’’ in die besonder, aandagmoet geniet. Die
daarstel van wetgewing ten einde die leemte aan te vul word ook as ’n verdere opsie ontleed. As
poligame huwelike in wetgewing aanvaar en gereguleer word, moet alle gevolge van poligamie
geakkommodeer word ook ten opsigte van die aksie van die afhanklike.
91 See in this regard especially Bonthuys 2002 SALJ 777-782.
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